What causes an energy crisis? Some case studies

JOHN KEMP REUTERS 28 Sep 2021 Energy crises – an anatomy

Every energy crisis has four elements:

- (1) Pre-crisis erosion of spare production capacity and/or inventories
- (2) Failure to appreciate increasing risk and take timely preventive action
- (3) Short-term trigger that turns potential shortage into actual shortage
- (4) Panicked reaction

Energy crises - an anatomy

- ❖ Britain's winter energy crisis (electricity, coal and gas) in Q1 1947
- **U.S.** oil shock in 1973/74
- ❖ Britain's energy crunch in 2021

(1) Pre-crisis erosion of spare production capacity and/or inventories

- ❖ Tightening U.K. coal supplies from 1943 onwards and ultra-low stocks by winter 1946
- * Erosion of spare oil production capacity in United States from late 1960s/early 1970s
- ❖ Tightening global gas market and increasing reliance on wind/gas generation in 2021

(2) Failure to appreciate increasing risk and take timely preventive action

- United Kingdom fortunate to get through winter 1946, stagnating coal production
- United States becomes increasingly reliant on imports from early 1970s, heating oil then gasoline shortages earlier in 1973
- ❖ Asia LNG prices spike in Q1 2021 and European gas inventories fall to unusually low levels in Q2 2021

(3) Short-term trigger that turns potential shortage into actual shortage

- United Kingdom experiences unusually prolonged cold weather in Jan-Feb 1947
- ❖ Arab oil embargo declared in October 1973
- ❖ U.K. wind farm output dwindles during still weather in Aug-Sep 2021

(4) Panicked reaction

What caused Britain's midwinter energy crisis in 1947?

Contributing causes

- Structural problems with Britain's coal industry since 1920s
- Coal industry nationalization, ownership issues, underinvestment and labour relations problems
- Failure to increase coal output during the war and afterwards
- Rapid growth in electricity consumption after the war ended (electricity as "modern" energy)
- Failure to rebuild depleted coal stocks over summer of 1946 after near shortages in winter of 1945/46
- Failure to plan and prepare for increasing risk of a coal and electricity crisis
- Disagreements between government ministers and officials
- > Over-optimism by minister of fuel and power Emanuel Shinwell
- Unusually low and prolonged temperatures in Jan and Feb 1947
- Blizzards hit rail and road transportation preventing fuel resupply

Time horizon

Long term



Medium term



Short term

United Kingdom coal stocks 1943-1953 million metric tonnes, year-end




■ Distributed stocks

Colliery stocks

Source: Historical Coal Data: Coal Availability and Consumption, 1853-2019 UK Department for Business, Energy, Industry and Skills @JKempEnergy


U.K. railways, coal loaded, 1939-1945 million tons, 4-week periods ending on dates shown



Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Ju

Source: History of the Second World War - Inland Transport, Table 1

United Kingdom domestic coal consumption, 1913-2013 annual, millions of metric tonnes



"Everybody knows there is going to a serious crisis in the coal industry except the Minister of Fuel and Power. I want to tell you there is not going to be a crisis in the coal industry, if by crisis you mean that industrial organisation is going to be seriously dislocated and that hundreds of factories are going to be closed down"

Emanuel Shinwell, Minister of Fuel and Power, October 24, 1946


Britain's cabinet met on Jan 7, 1947, to agree an emergency reduction of 50% in coal supplies to industry

Electricity generators started to run out of coal later in Jan and Feb 1947


Power cuts led to widespread factory closures with millions thrown temporarily out of work

U.K. official unemployment rate, 1946-1948 monthly, percent

showing impact of factory closures and layoffs during fuel crisis in Jan-Mar 1947




U.K. net electricity supplied, 1930-1960 annual, percent change from prior year




Source: UK Historical Electricity Statistics
UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (formerly Ministry of Fuel and Power)

U.K. coal consumption for electricity generation, 1930-1960 annual, percent change from prior year




Source: UK Historical Electricity Statistics
UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (formerly Ministry of Fuel and Power)

U.S. crude oil production, 1920-1999 monthly, million b/d




U.S. crude oil production, 1950-1979
Percent change from prior year, monthly and three-month average



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

Texas as the swing producer in the oil market 1947-1972 Production was controlled through market demand orders which restricted well output to a percentage of the maximum



Source for the data in the chart is Oil, Gas and Government: the US Experience by Robert Bradley (1996)

Texas Railroad Commission estimated demand for the state's oil and controlled output by telling operators how many days per month they could flow their wells (pre-1963) or what percentage of the maximum efficient flow rate the well could operate at (1963-onwards) On March 16, 1972, the Railroad Commission issued a General Market Demand Order which set allowable output to 100% for the first time in almost a quarter of a century -- marking the moment at which the United States ran out of spare production capacity, and pricing power in the oil market passed to OPEC.

On October 16, 1973 the Arab members of OPEC agreed to cut production by 10% with a further 5% reduction each month in protest at US and European support for Israel. On October 20, 1973, Saudi Arabia embargoed oil exports to the United States and was subsequently joined by other Arab states.


The oil shock of 1973/74 is often blamed on OPEC's actions in 1973 but the seeds of the crisis had been sown much earlier with the progressive erosion of US spare capacity from the late 1960s onwards. @JKempEnergy

Asia LNG: Japan-Korea Marker, front-month futures contract U.S.\$ per million British thermal units daily and exponentially-weighted moving average ($\alpha = 0.15$)




Source: CME Group

European natural gas inventories reported stocks as percent of total storage capacity excluding pandemic year of 2020



Source: Gas Infrastructure Europe

European natural gas storage, 2021 percentage points, surplus (+) or deficit (-) to five-year average



Source: Gas Infrastructure Europe

UK spot wholesale gas and electricity prices, 2015-2021

