
Volume warfare in the oil market Saudi Arabia, Russia, the United States and the balance of power

JOHN KEMP REUTERS 11 Mar 2020

## Saudi Arabia and Russia have lost market share to the United States U.S. output has doubled since 2011, while Saudi and Russia output has stagnated



Source: Joint Organisations Data Initiative


U.S. shale sector has become marginal supplier to the global market Shale has captured all incremental global consumption when Brent >\$70 per barrel

### Global oil consumption and production, 2012-2019

	Global oil consumption	U.S. crude production	L48 crude production ex Gulf	U.S. supplies all global incremental consumption?
2012	1.0	0.9	0.9	NO
2013	1.6	1.0	1.0	NO
2014	0.9	1.3	1.2	YES
2015	1.9	0.7	0.5	NO
2016	1.7	-0.6	-0.7	NO
2017	1.7	0.5	0.4	NO
2018	1.4	1.6	1.6	YES
2019	0.8	1.2	1.1	YES

#### Incremental million barrels per day

Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration @JKempEnergy U.S. shale production has recorded fastest increase anywhere in history Second shale boom (2017-2019) was adding +2 million b/d per year at its peak




U.S. oil production growth forecast to slow even before outbreak of volume war Growth predicted to slow to +0.4 million b/d by Q4 2020 and +0.6 million by Q4 2021


> U.S. crude oil production, 2000-2021 million b/d, change from prior year, three-month average, actual and forecast



Oil prices expected to remain anchored around \$65 per barrel through 2024 U.S. shale acts as price maker, <u>but cyclical volatility around average level</u>




Global oil consumption hit by trade war in 2019 and now coronavirus in 2020 Consumption growth well below long-term trend of 1.4% per year in both years



World oil consumption growth, 1980-2020 annual percent change, estimated for 2019, forecast for 2020


Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019

# Oil prices decline in response to deteriorating economic outlook Decline consistent with synchronized global economic slowdown or recession



Brent spot price, 1990-2020


Spot prices and calendar spreads have been sliding since the start of the year Coronavirus weighing on market even before volume war



..... R-axis: Brent six-month calendar spread (U.S./bbl)

Both series are averaged over 30 trading days to smooth short-term volatility

# Brent spreads plunged after OPEC<sup>+</sup> failed to agree on further output restraint Saudi Arabia and Russia subsequently threaten to increase production



Price difference Brent month 1 and month 7 (U.S.\$/bbl) Contango (-) or backwardation (+)

Source: ICE Futures, @JKempEnergy

Oil traders anticipate significant over-production and large build in inventories Brent calendar spread reverts to largest contango since Nov 2016 (before OPEC<sup>+</sup> launched)


Shape of the futures price curve in Brent crude, 2014-2020 Contango (-) or backwardation (+) from months 1 to 7 (US\$/bbl)



Price difference Brent month 1 and month 7 (U.S.\$/bbl) Contango (-) or backwardation (+)

Source: ICE Futures, @JKempEnergy

Brent calendar spread signaling large inventory build Six-month spread in 10<sup>th</sup> percentile for all trading days since 1990



Source: ICE Futures Europe

# Strategic choices for Saudi Arabia and Russia Protect prices or defend market share

### **Russia's strategy**

- Stop erosion of market share
- Allow prices to fall in response to coronavirus
- Eliminate oversupply via price adjustment
- Force further slowdown in U.S. shale
- Incentivise faster consumption growth
- Permit long-term expansion of Russia output

# Saudi Arabia's strategy

- Stop erosion of prices
- > Accept further (temporary?) loss of market share
- Eliminate oversupply via OPEC<sup>+</sup> output adjustment
- > Extend and deepen OPEC<sup>+</sup> production restraints
- Maximize short-term oil revenues

Volume warfare breaks out after OPEC<sup>+</sup> fails to agree on deeper cuts Other outcomes were possible but Saudi Arabia and Russia elected for volume war

Russia elects to end production controls rather than deepen them, preserves ability to raise output , force further reduction in shale production and defence market share

Saudi Arabia opts to go into punishment mode and communicates maximum pain strategy to market

- Signals flat out production
- Supply extra oil from stocks
- Increase maximum capacity

#### Escalate-to-negotiate strategy

- Attempt to engineer short-term crisis
- Force Russia to negotiate
- Force White House to intervene
- > Avoid protracted period of low prices

U.S. oil production forecasts revised down as a result of lower prices Production expected to be roughly flat year-on-year in Q4 2020 and 2021

U.S. crude oil production, 2000-2021

million b/d, change from prior year, three-month average, actual and forecast 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration ("Short-Term Energy Outlook", Mar 2020) @JKempEnergy

# Volume warfare Strategy and outcomes similar to analysis of armed conflict

Volume warfare usually breaks out because one side or both miscalculates resolve or capacity to absorb pain, its own or others

Top policymakers sometimes opt to fight rather than appear weak in front of domestic and international audiences

Volume warfare tests resilience – willingness and ability to absorb short-term financial pain to protect long-term interests

Volume warfare establishes new balance of power or re-establishes deterrence among major producers