SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK : CIVIL TERM : PART 53

REBECCA HAUSSMANN, trustee of
KONSTANTINS HAUSSMANN TRUST,
and JACK E. CATTAN, derivatively on behalf
Of BAYER AG,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
Index No.
651500/20
WERNER BAUMANN, et al
Defendants.
and
BAYER AG,

> Nominal defendant.
---------------------------------------------- X (VIA TEAMS) December 13, 2021

BEFORE:
HONORABLE ANDREW BORROK, Justice, Supreme Court

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Your appearances for the record, please.
MR. ROBERT: Clifford Robert on behalf of plaintiff with my partner Michael Farina along with Jamie Baskin, Frank Bottini (ph), Albert Chang (ph) and Benjamin Brafman, Mr. Baskin, who the Court has granted a pro hac vice application, will be arguing this morning. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Baskin, I want you to check your microphone.

MR. SAVITT: William Savitt here. We are here for the Bayer defendants. With me is my partner John Lynch, my colleagues Lara Samet Buchwald representing Bank of America Corporation and $B$ of $A$. With me is Larry Portnoy.

MR. KURTZBERG: Joel Kurtzberg of Cahill Gordon and Reindel. With me today is Adam Mintz. We are appearing on behalf of Credit Suisse defendants.

THE COURT: I was starting to say that we have a lot to discuss this morning and I'm happy to start with any one of the three motions that we have to talk about. My preference would be to start with bank defendants' motion, but I leave it to all of you.

I am hearing an echo. You really need to mute if

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you're not speaking. Whoever does start for the defendants, I would really appreciate if we made a record as to the background transaction and then I'll hear the motion. But, I would suggest that we start with the bank defendants' motion unless you all have discussed this and you want to start in a different place.

MS. BUCHWALD: This is Lara Samet Buchwald on behalf of Bank of America and B of A Securities. I'm quite happy to start. Although, I'm looking over to Mr. Savitt. If he has a preference, that's fine as well.

THE COURT: Mr. Savitt, I think it may be your speakerphone that's causing the issue. Let's start with either one of your motions. Then we can either do the Bayer Corp or wherever you want to start, but I would like a background --

MR. SAVITT: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: -- about the deal.
MR. SAVITT: I appreciate that and I think it may make sense for us to start in some sense and by that, I mean the various defendants, that some of the other motions -- we will do the best we can and if you want to jump to the other folks, of course. We're really here principally to answer your questions, your Honor, so we will try to be responsive. Any time I'm not addressing -THE COURT: Don't worry. I'm not shy.

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MR. SAVITT: By the background transaction, your Honor, I think you're asking about the merger between Bayer and Monsanto that is in some sense the fulcrum that the plaintiffs are operating under. So I'll say just a word about that. That transaction was what? Was a 2016 transaction and it was in a consolidating industry where -- and it involved Bayer's -- essentially, its life science and agricultural division. Bayer is a very large company. Of course, everyone knows it for its aspirin and its various health sciences and pharmaceuticals, but it has a very large, very large footprint in agriculture and life scientists as well. And the idea of the transaction was to create scale and scope in a consolidating industry by pairing Bayer with Monsanto.

That transaction was consummated after a fairly lengthy anti-trust review both in the United States and internationally and was consummated, I think, in 2018. Yes, 2018. Now, that in some important respect, the merger itself is fairly traditional. It reflected a large transaction between two international brands with very substantial operational and commercial synergies in a consolidating industry where the industrial logic as it was reported was to ensure that the brands of both companies could continue to compete at a high level and increasingly difficult global marketplace.

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There were certain divestitures made in connection with the transaction as your Honor, of course, knows are customary and the merger was consummated more or less along the normal course. My friends on the plaintiff's side have drawn attention in their pleadings to much of the criticism that was made of the transaction. There was criticism of the transaction. There was praise for the transaction as is often the case and the deal closed.

Now, that --
THE COURT: And the deal itself involved companies
from -- that are formed where?
MR. SAVITT: Bayer is a German-chartered company with its seat in Leverkausen, which I think is spelled L-E-B-E-N-K-A-U-S-E-N, and the judicial seat by which I mean the court, the regional court that oversees is it is in Cologne, Germany. That was one side of the transaction. The other side of the transaction was the Monsanto Corporation, a Delaware-chartered corporation headquartered in Missouri.

After the merger was consummated, there were some adverse litigation results associated with the Roundup pesticide product. Those lawsuits were all pending in California. They were tried by a California jury, by California lawyers, presided by a California judge with no visible nexus to New York. And I think it's fair to say,

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and I don't want to speak for my good friends on the other side, but $I$ think it is fair to say that the essence of the complaint is that the litigation exposures turned out to be very substantial that gives rise to a cause of action. Those litigation exposures were all generated in connection with California legal proceedings here. Again, no nexus to New York.

That I think or I hope, your Honor, supplies some of the transactional background to the complaint in our motion to dismiss. There are a few other framing facts that we think are important.

THE COURT: Where is the transaction approved?
And I kind of was hoping you would in light of the basis for your motion, $I$ kind of was hoping that you'd make a more substantial record as it relates to how this transaction was put together, and how the approvals were done, and where the due diligence took place, and how that relates to the gravamen of the complaint which is that the board failed to meet its obligations as it relates to estimating this risk that we've now talked about.

MR. SAVITT: Thank you, your Honor. So let me try to address that. The board met many, many times. I think it is fair to say dozens and dozens of times in connection with the transaction. The board of directors -- let me step back for a second. There are two boards of directors

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of Bayer because --
THE COURT: Right.
MR. SAVITT: There's a supervisory board whose main job in life is to watch the managers and there is a management board whose main job in life is to manage the business. Both of those boards are comprised overwhelmingly of German nationals. They met in Germany. Every single meeting of the board was in Germany. I can't say that every person at every board meeting was physically in Germany because, of course, some of the -- some of the members of the various boards participated by telephone or video which wasn't nearly as common in those days as they are now.

THE COURT: The situs of all those meet meetings was in Germany.

MR. SAVITT: Yes, the situs of every single one of the board meetings was in Germany. Now, moreover, the diligence and I don't -- in response to your Honor's request to make a record, you have the pleadings in front of you, which we accept will be taken as true for purposes of the motion.

It is correct that among other advisors, Bayer hired some New York-based advisors. It is true that there were some e-mails in and out of New York. It is not true that any part of the negotiation of the transaction happened in New York.

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Let me say that again. It is not true -- it is not even alleged that any part of the negotiation of the transaction happened in New York. It is alleged that some part of the due diligence happened in New York. Whether that's true or not, we think is highly open to question. It is not even alleged that all of it took place in New York.

I don't want to fight against the hypothetical of a motion to dismiss, your Honor, respecting as I do the pleading standard. But, even on the account of the complaint, the following is true. None of the members of the board of direct- -- of the supervisory board is a resident of New York. Nearly all of them reside in Europe. The vast majority reside in Germany. None of the meetings at which this transaction was considered, negotiated, deliberated upon happened in New York, none of them. All happened in Germany.

The transaction did not involve a New York company on either side, not a New York-chartered company, not a New York-headquartered company. The best that can be said of the allegations is that there were some incidental contacts and the hiring of a New York banker with respect to the transaction. And I think the -- that is a fair statement of the pleadings and that's a fair statement of the record.

And boiled down, your Honor, that's the ground that we think that a motion needs to be decided upon because

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we think the law tells the Court what to do in connection with that. And at the end of it, if we proceed beyond this motion, there will be a quarrel between the defendants and the plaintiffs regarding the accuracy of their allegations about the New York scope of this.

We think they've overstated it rather substantially. However, even taking the pleadings as true, I think what I set before the Court represents a fair summary of the pleadings record for the motion. Let me stop there, your Honor, and ask if that's in a sense responsive to the Court's question.

THE COURT: That's what $I$ wanted you to get at. Thank you.

MR. SAVITT: Thank you, your Honor. And I mean, just to make a few further points a little bit along the same lines, not only is Bayer a German company organized under German law, but the certificate of incorporation requires that litigation like this be brought in the courts of Germany, specifically in Cologne, which is why I made reference to Cologne a little bit earlier. 27 of the 31 individual defendants, your Honor, reside in Europe. None reside in New York.

Additionally, and this is a further point that goes to several branches of our motion that are already pending in the German court, securities actions addressing

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the exact same matters as this lawsuit. Those lawsuits have been brought by New York-based investors represented by well-known securities lawyers. They are pending where they are supposed to be pending, in Cologne, Germany.

Now, I think what -- there are some background facts and photos. We have essentially four issues before the Court in our motion. One having to do with personal jurisdiction, one having to do with venue, German corporate law and New York corporate law. I'm happy to march through them in the order that seems sensible to us, but I'm particularly interested in what's on your mind.

THE COURT: No, we can go through the way that you want to go through this. I read the papers and I'm very comfortable with the allegations in this case and any way that you want to serve it up is fine.

MR. SAVITT: Thank you, your Honor. Let me try and say a word about what strikes us as the highlights with respect to each of these issues. I'll start with personal jurisdiction because personal jurisdiction is generally thought to be a gating item. It needn't be, of course, and the Court is free to decide this motion on any one of the four issues that we set in front of it. But, ever since the first day of law school, we are thought to think of jurisdiction as a preliminary. So we will talk about it as a preliminary item. There are --

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THE COURT: Some might say standing might come before and I know that's probably an issue that you want to talk to me about, so we can start at personal jurisdiction. We can start at standing and the internal affairs doctrine and whether or not BCL displaces the internal affairs. We can start any way you want. I'm locked and loaded as they say. I'm ready to go.

MR. SAVITT: Ready to go. All right. So we'll try to keep with you. On personal jurisdiction, there are -- the issue -- the real issue is whether the long arms statute 302A captures this case and there are two branches to that provision. One asks whether the defendants transacted business in New York and the other asks whether the claims arose from New York contacts.

To get the relief of jurisdiction under the statute, the plaintiff has to satisfy both pieces, not just one. So taking the transacting business prong first, the question is whether a defendant here has what the courts call a continuing relationship with the forum involving, and I'm quoting now, "sustained and substantial transaction of business in New York." It's not an easy test to satisfy. We cited numerous cases involving contacts much greater in our view than what's alleged here. We want to -- I want to draw attention to the Aquiline case.

Thank you for the interruption, Madam Court

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Reporter. I know how hard this is for you, so don't hesitate to interrupt any time that's useful.

The reason we say it is instructive is because in some sense, it seems fairly similar to this case by a big degree. It involved Belgium nationals that repeatedly came to New York, negotiated the transaction here, but were still held to be beyond the reach of the long arm statute. Those business meetings in New York didn't indicate an intention to seek out a New York forum said the court and so it just wasn't enough.

Those facts, which were the key facts there, are ones that just aren't present here. It can't be alleged that Bayer, its principals, its directors, its managers came to New York. It didn't happen. Nothing that happened in Aquiline happened here. And yet that case was held to be beyond the scope of the long arm statute because those contacts don't meet the statutory bar.

And we have a bunch of cases, your Honor, in our papers that -- the Paine Webber case and the Spencer Trask Ventures case, they should control here because the contacts here, which boiled all the way down, involved the retention of New York advisors and a meeting after the deal was entered into between one member of the management board and then President Elect Trump in New York are far, far in theory to other series of contacts that were held in

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Aquiline under 302 (a) (1).
And it is important to notice and this is something that $I$ think lends to the briefing, your Honor, that the plaintiffs don't even try to harmonize their claim to jurisdiction. They don't even try. What they do instead is invoke what they call the agency theory of jurisdiction. The idea is that all of the defendants, the individual defendants and the entity defendants are subject to jurisdiction because of incidental contact with New York. That is to say there was incidental contact and all of the agents are swept in by virtue of that agency theory.

Now, as threshold, there's nothing to solve the problem that those incidental contacts don't cut it under the agency theory put in front of the Court. But, even worse for this theory, the agency principles just isn't available under these facts. That requires detailed allegations describing how every defendant controlled the --

THE COURT: Are you talking about the Kreutter analysis?

MR. SAVITT: Exactly, your Honor. It just -- it is an analysis that isn't remotely alleged here and your Honor has got it and there's just no possible showing that the agents here who are sought to be brought into court can be subject to that analysis.

I wanted to say a word because I want to go right
into this issue. It is an interesting one. I know the Court will be very familiar with the Renren decision.

THE COURT: I take it you don't mean the decision that $I$ issued in the last few days on that case.

MR. SAVITT: I do not, your Honor, nor do I really mean the First Department's affirmance of your lengthier decision of a little while ago which has a lot of relevance. I'm sure I'm going to hear about this from our good adversary. Our view is that that case is a really good case for us. You know far more about it than we ever will.

But, the reason $I$ say that is as your Honor knows, the pleadings there included really detailed allegations as to the New York action of every defendant repeated availment of New York to create a de facto venture capital fund in New York, reliance on New York law, reliance on New York banking licenses, approvals by New York regulators, notice provisions pointed to New York in the relevant contracts.

The Court took care to enumerate those contacts in its analysis. We interpret the Court's care to enumerate those contacts to seem that they were important to the analysis just as the precedented courts require. That kind of factual allegation, your Honor, is completely lacking here. Nothing close is alleged. Nothing close can be alleged and that pleading failure, we think, precludes plaintiffs from establishing that the defendants here

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transacted business in New York within $302(a)(1)$.
I'll say a word about the New York contacts branch of the inquiry, too, because in some sense, it is even simpler. The key case as we put in our case is Justice Scarpula's Poms decision. In response to our invocation of that authority, the plaintiffs ignored it, made no attempt to engage it. Plaintiff's position on New York contacts can't be squared with Poms, we submit, your Honor.

The issue there, as the Court knows, is that plaintiff sought to sue Canadian defendants here, but plaintiff pointed out to satisfy the contacts requirement that the company was listed on a New York Exchange and agreed to New York forum selection provision and deal-related documents, hired New York advisors.

Those contacts again were superior to contacts here. There is no forum selection provision for New York. It's to the contrary. Forum was good according to the documents in Germany and only Germany.

The court there, your Honor, had no trouble holding that the list of unconnected relationships that I'm quoting now is insufficient to show the required affiliation between New York and the underlying controversy. Plaintiffs provided literally no answer to this question.

And so we submit that the New York contacts are very thin, are thinner than those rejected in Poms and
that's an independent basis to require dismissal. THE COURT: It seems that the decision is consistent with what Judge Nathan was thinking about in the Holzman decision when in her dicta in the Holzman decision. MR. SAVITT: Yes, your Honor. We think those cases are. We rely on them both. We cited them both and we think they point in the same direction, your Honor, absolutely. I was going to pass to the forum non issue, your Honor, if that's convenient to the Court.

THE COURT: Sure. That's fine.
MR. SAVITT: So forum, your Honor, is a common law doctrine, but it's been codified in New York in 327 of the CPLR and it is another threshold issue in a notion that has many of them as the Court of Appeals set out in the Pahlavi decision. The boiled down question under 327 is whether the lawsuit before the court will be better adjudicated elsewhere. Those are the words of the Court of Appeals. Then the court set out six factors to guide that inquiry and we think and we try to set in our papers why all of them point to dismissal here in favor of German forum non.

The first one is whether the lawsuit imposes an unnecessary burden on New York courts. This case is a German law case. Everybody knows it is and we understand and agree that the Court is fully capable of applying German law.

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THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. SAVITT: There is no doubt about that. There is no doubt about it, but avoiding the burden of doing so when it is proper under the law is also a good thing, a virtue. It's something that's been indicated in other cases. And there are a whole raft of lawsuits as we mentioned much like this that have been filed in New York courts, all of which collectively are reasonably likely to create a burden on this court.

A forum non conveniens dismissal here would curb those filings and spare the justices of this court the need to hear those foreign cases especially in circumstances like these where there's already a lawsuit about the same subject matter seeking substantially the same relief pending in Germany.

The second factor is whether the litigation would impose a burden on the defendants. The answer is, of course, it would. Nearly all of the witnesses here would have to travel from Germany to Centre Street to appear before the Court. And beyond that substantial burden -- look, it may be that depositions will be taken in Germany if the depositions proceed, but when the case is tried, with any luck, we will be able to get together downtown and try the case and you are going to have a couple of dozen Europeans who are coming into this lawsuit and
there is no way around it. It is a very substantial burden. And on top of it, and this is as a matter of law, as an outside of the United States Supreme Court, there is a unique burden requiring foreign nationals to defend themselves in our courts. That's the Asahi decision that we cite in our papers. That's just the burden that we're trying to-- I think the plaintiffs are trying to impose here and we're trying to avoid. And here, I will again point out the fact there is essentially a parallel litigation in Germany, so there will be the additional burden of duplicative litigation in circumstances where it is not necessary.

The third factor under Pahlavi is whether the lawsuit arises from actions taken in New York. We've talked a bit about that, your Honor, in discussing factual predicate and discussing personal jurisdiction. But, to re-emphasize the claim at the bottom of it here is that the board members of Bayer didn't take adequate care in considering the Monsanto deal.

Nearly all of those board members were residents in Germany or elsewhere in New York every part of the relevant time period. No board meeting was held in this jurisdiction. There is no allegation that the board ever met or deliberated here. Germany was the locus of all of that activity.

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The third factor thus points towards dismissal.
The fourth factor under Pahlavi says where are the document's witnesses. Here again, we talked about it. The answer is they are all in Germany. The answer is they are all in Germany. There is really no alternative way of looking at the problem.

The next factor is whether there's an available alternative forum. The German courts are an available alternative. I've mentioned a couple of times that there is another case pending and $I$ think it is an important consideration. But, as to Germany, we don't need to guess. The First Department has told us that Germany is an available alternative forum and this is a point to emphasize the Porsche case, Viking Global decision of the First Department. In that case, a recent decision, five years old, of the First Department.

The First Department held as a matter of law that Germany, I'm quoting, "provides adequate alternative forum in circumstances very much like these." In fact, this case is about as all-fours with that one as you're likely to find. Some investors of Viking were unhappy about an investment they made in Volkswagen Securities in connection with a potential bid for Porsche. The trial court, Justice Ramos, here in the commercial division kept the case over forum non conveniens motion.

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The First Department reversed. It held that a smattering a secondary communications and actions just like these, just like these in New York didn't establish an adequate nexus in New York, that the great majority of what's alleged was centered in Germany just like here, just like here and Germany's courts provided an adequate alternative forum.

That's clear, recent, controlling authority that says dismissal is in order here, too. We submit, in fact, that our case is even more compelling given that there is already a case pending out there and that German law requires that these cases proceed in Germany. That's remarkable and we say it is a nullable [sic] concession, your Honor, that plaintiffs don't even address the Porsche case. They don't even try to explain how its defense under forum non conveniens can survive the First Department's analysis. The reason we think is that there is no answer. The First Department authority essentially says that this case does not belong in this court.

Finally, your Honor, the last factor, Germany's interest in adjudicating the matter at issue talks decisively towards dismissal. Case after case recognizes the nation's interest in adjudicating questions involving the internal affairs of its corporation. We cited the Fernie case where it was held that New York courts should
defer to the interest of the Bahama court in resolving corporate governance issues under their law.

The Holzman case, your Honor, that we spoke about, exactly the same effect. Plaintiffs don't try to harmonize their position in --

THE COURT: Admittedly, Holzman is dicta, but I understand what you're saying.

MR. SAVITT: The Holzman case was dictum, but nevertheless, it is judicial learning on the point that points in the same direction. What they do instead is they cite a few other cases without saying how the ones that seem to control don't. Principally, the HSBC case, the Mason Mahon case. And here again, the differences provide all the teaching because there, the wrongdoing that was alleged all happened in New York.

There, the main defendants lived in New York. The main defendants worked in New York. The corporate defendants were incorporated in New York. The whole thing was in New York. So, of course, that's a different case. The Broida case having everything to do with the lawsuit happened in New York, everything. Not even disputed. The only thing pointing anywhere else in that case was the fact that the corporate defendant was a Delaware-chartered entity. Here, again, different in nearly every way that matters to the analysis. Same is true with some of the
other cases.
The differences are so stark between the plaintiff's principal cases and the facts even that they allege that we think will confirm the lack of a satisfactory New York nexus here. They certainly can't do anything to undermine the clear teaching of Porsche and some of these other cases or change the analysis under the forum non. I want to talk a bit about German law derivative standing, but here again happy to --

THE COURT: Before you get there, $I$ would think that this might be a moment where Ms. Buchwald wants to weigh in on the forum non analysis as it relates to her argument that the wrong bank defendants are in this lawsuit, period, because and as it relates to the engagement letter and what was in the various engagement letters because I think what she is going to tell me is that that is an additional factor that the Court should consider as it relates to the forum non analysis.

Right, Ms. Buchwald?
MS. BUCHWALD: Thank you, your Honor. With respect to our forum non argument, what I would say is everything that Mr. Savitt just said we agree with 100 percent. With respect to our argument about the wrong entities, at least analytically the way that we think about it is that is an independent reason why the bank should be

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out. That under 3211 --
THE COURT: I get that, but weren't there designations in the various engagement letters that the Court maybe should consider as it relates to a forum non analysis?

MS. BUCHWALD: Correct, your Honor. So that what your Honor is --

THE COURT: That's really what $I$ was asking you to weigh in on because $I$ thought this was the magic moment to make that point. I'll give you a bit of time to make your other arguments, but I just thought that for the purpose of review, this might be the moment to make that point.

MS. BUCHWALD: That's fair, your Honor, and it is frankly two related points. One is the entities being non-U.S. entities at least with respect to the $B$ of $A$ entities that were engaged. That counts as in the same direction. It is also the fact that the forum selection clauses point to either Germany or in one case Singapore against supporting it. So thank you for the opportunity.

THE COURT: Let's keep going, Mr. Savitt, on the standing argument and I think this is where you're going to talk to me about the internal affairs doctrine.

MR. SAVITT: I am, but first I'm going to do a little detour in the law in central Europe.

THE COURT: Go right ahead.

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MR. SAVITT: Thank you, your Honor. The issue of how German law structures the derivative standing question is one that the Court needn't reach. It follows only if it is the right forum and there is jurisdiction, but if the Court wants to get into those merits, the first issue we think analytically that comes next is the German law questions as to whether the case can proceed.

There are a lot of obstacles to suit under German law. Some of them parallel to what we have in U.S. law in New York. Some are a little different. All of them arise under the German Stock Corporation Act and the Court has before it two expert affidavits by Mr. Jens Koch and there's also an expert report in rebuttal that's been submitted by our friends on the other side whose name not only escapes me, but I wouldn't dare try to pronounce. It would be a bit of delay for all of us.

There is a bit of a predicate, your Honor, for you to take a look at the German law. To be -- to bring a derivative action on behalf of a German company, a plaintiff first must be a registered stockholder of the company. The plaintiffs here are not. The plaintiff must show, must plead facts showing that before learning of the basis of their derivative actions, they own shares. The plaintiffs here have not done that.

A plaintiff seeking to bring a derivative claim in

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the name of the German corporation must show it owns at least 100,000 Euro's worth of company stock. The plaintiffs here don't allege that either. The plaintiff, and this is a familiar requirement, must ask the board to bring suit first. That's essentially the German equivalent of demand futility. The plaintiffs here didn't do that either.

A German derivative plaintiff has to plead specific facts showing a bases to suspect dishonest conduct. For the reasons we set out in our papers, that standard hasn't been met either.

And finally, the plaintiff must obtain permission from a German court before filing derivatively. That hasn't happened here either. As I say, some number of these things are very substantially like our rules. They have an echo in the requirement of being an owner of shares and an owner of shares at all relevant times, an owner of shares in a way that's reliable having a significant interest in the matter. And, of course, the demand futility issue, which the Court knows to ensure that in most cases, the decision whether to pursue corporate litigation rests with the board of the corporation.

I don't think it is really controverted that these are the prerequisites of a derivative suit under German law. I don't think there is a lot of space between plaintiffs and us on that. I think it is pretty much black and white in

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the statute. And generally speaking, the plaintiffs don't contend that they satisfy those prerequisites. In fact, in their briefing --

THE COURT: They do argue demand futility.
MR. SAVITT: Fair enough. They say -- they say demand futility sort of, I'll get to that and they do say that they are registered shareholders, but they may be sued, and they say that they have satisfied the appropriate level of pleading. They do join us on those points.

The reason I say what I do about demand futility, your Honor, is there is this wrinkle that's more a question of the New York side of the house than the German side of the house of the two boards. And the relevant question for suit against all of the supervisory board defendants which, your Honor, is the vast majority of them, is whether there's a demand futility as to the management board. And there just isn't. There just isn't.

There's no allegations at all as to three of the five members of the management board, nothing that can possibly satisfy the burden there. And there's a question on the other side of the house as to whether there is allegation as to the supervisory board for claims against two members of the management board. But, look at -- as to the great majority of these factors, the plaintiffs don't even contend that they've met the German law requirement,
but they say a portion of the German law doesn't apply.
It is pretty well-settled in New York. The corporate governance questions are governed by the law of the state where the entity is chartered. That's the internal affairs doctrine. It is well-settled in this court, in the First Department, at the level of the United States Supreme Court and accordingly, over and over, courts in New York, courts of the commercial division have looked to the state of incorporation to determine whether a derivative litigant has met the requirements to standing. As your Honor said in Renren, the company, and I'm quoting from that decision, was incorporated in the Cayman Islands. So Cayman Islands law governs the issue of derivative standing. So, too, here, the company is incorporated in Germany, so German law governs the issue of derivative standing. If that's the law on this issue, we submit the plaintiffs can't possibly meet the bar and they may know it, too, because what they say is that's not the law.

They invoke Section 1319 of the BCL and claim that that overrides the internal affairs doctrine and they rely on the First Department's very brief Culligan decision to support that proposition. We think the 1319 argument cannot reasonably be reconciled with the vast, vast bulk of the cited cases. Justice Cohen --

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THE COURT: I agree.
MR. SAVITT: Okay. Well, I won't gild that lilly in that case if your Honor has had a chance to look at those authorities. We don't think that's a --

THE COURT: I think that I necessarily spoke to the issue in Renren and Judge Cohen wrote more about it in his decision and I think that they're conflating jurisdiction with standing which are two different issues.

MR. SAVITT: Your Honor, thank you, and I won't -- as I said, that is precisely our argument and we think it is the only way to make sense of this case law and the text of the statute.

So the right way to look at the question of derivative standing is to look at the law of the state of incorporation. And there's one other escape hatch the plaintiffs try to devise for the matter of the German rules. It has to do with the distinction between procedural rules and substantive rules.

The substantive issue is a German law question. The issue whether it is procedural or substantive, that's a New York law question. What does that law tell us? Well, first of all, the question of derivative standing generally is substantive. The First Department said so expressly in the In Re Hakimian case. More specifically, the pre-suit demand requirement is substantive. The First Department

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told us that in part. The requirement to have registered shares, that's substantive. This Court said so in the Aventura case. Minimum ownership requirements, that's substantive. The Second Circuit said so applying New York in the Hausman case.

There is no viable argument that these German law requirements can be pushed to the side as procedural. The best the plaintiffs can muster on this point is to observe that most of these requirements appear under a heading in Section 148 of the German Corporation Law that includes the word "procedure." Leave to the side that the plaintiffs haven't done anything to show that Germany intended to deprive all of those provisions by substantive force by that heading.

The point that matters is that whether a standing requirement is substantive is a question of New York law. The reason they are substantive, it is not for nothing they're substantive. The reason is they determine whether a stockholder has rights and that's what determines under New York law whether a matter is substantive or procedural. A heading in a German statute can't change that.

Also, to the extent that this is -- this point should ever have any traction, we should note that the requirement that the derivative plaintiff hold registered shares, which the plaintiffs cannot possibly meet here,

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isn't under Section 148. It is not subject to this argument, this procedure versus substantive argument at any rate.

The one area where the procedure versus substantive question becomes intricate is in the matter of the leave of court requirement. Resolving that issue isn't necessarily a decision because there are so many other aspects of the German requirement that haven't been satisfied, but it is an interesting loophole of the law the Scottish Re HSBC and Aventura decision.

They essentially set up the following inquiry about that requirement about that one issue. What they say is that if the rule is one that is a court rule, that any derivative litigant who goes in front of this court needs to get approval, that's a procedural rule.

But, if it is a corporation rule, that anywhere someone seeks to bring a derivative claim, they need to get approval of the court. It is a corporate law rule and, therefore, substantive. It makes a lot of sense ultimately because one does simply pertain to the procedures of the court and the other is something that attaches to the rights of the stockholders and, therefore, substantive.

The Aventura decision is actually very -- parses this issue quite clearly and as we set out in our papers, in this case, the right answer is that the rule is substantive.

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So I'll stop there on that excursion into German law and see if you have any further questions on it. THE COURT: I don't.

MR. SAVITT: Thank you, your Honor. I'll be quick with the last issue which is the matter of New York derivative standing. Putting everything we talked about to the aside, everything, jurisdiction, forum non, German law, take a look at New York law. There are two standing rules that have to be surmounted here before the claim can proceed even imagining and we think imagining contrary to the right analysis, that this issue is one that the Court needs to get to.

One is the futility issue and your Honor made reference to it a little bit ago, and the other is contemporaneous ownership. Let me address that rule first, the contemporaneous ownership rule because it is very straightforward. This is a common law rule. It is codified at 626 of the BCL and it permits derivative standing only for plaintiffs who held shares at the time of the legal alleged wrongdoing and throughout the litigation from beginning to end.

It is a rule that is strictly enforced as the First Department has made clear. A derivative plaintiff must make a particularized pleaded showing of ownership at all relevant times. Plaintiffs here made no showing that

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they owned shares at the time of the action they complained of. All they do is make a reference to common stock ownership at the time of the transaction.

Let's be clear. The plaintiffs do not plead when they acquired Bayer shares. They do not allege they owned shares at the time of the harms complained of. This is a fatal pleading deficiency, grounds to dismiss without anything more.

The demand futility inquiry, your Honor, is a little more complicated as it often is. And I know the Court knows the Marx against Akers case very well. I'll only say that we're happy to rely principally on our papers in this matter, but I would suggest that this wrinkle in German law is one of note because as the affidavits $I$ think make clear and stands to reason about the structure of the German law and why there are two boards.

The management board can sue the supervisory board. The supervisory board can sue the management board. So the question has to be with respect to claims against the one whether the other board's majority is unconflicted.

There is no showing at all as to all of the supervisory board members that the management board majority is incapable of bringing suit and was otherwise unconflicted. That leaves the claims against the two defendant members of the board of management, Mr. Baumann

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and Mr. Convent. And the question here is whether the allegations excuse the plaintiff's failure to make demand upon the supervisory board. They say demand was futile because it was interested in the Monsanto transaction.

Why was it interested in the Monsanto transaction? Did they get a personal benefit from it? No. Did they have Monsanto shares? No. Did they hold Bayer shares? Yes. You might ask where is the interest? Here is where it is. The conclusory allegation that the board was entrenched. We cited numerous cases in our opening brief showing that such conclusory allegations don't clear the bar. Not a single one of them was addressed.

So I'll stop there, your Honor. We have other arguments under Marx. This is an argument of last resort that we think the Court needn't get to. I am happy to take questions on this or any other aspect of our argument should the Court desire.

THE COURT: I think I'm clear.
But, Ms. Robinson, is this a moment where you'd like a minute before we let Mr. Baskin because he's going to want significant time to address all of this for lack of better words and if you're going to take two minutes or four minutes, this is the right moment to do it because, otherwise, we are going to go for a good hour. Let's take one minute.

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Look back and see if you have any questions for Mr. Savitt and I'll just check in with my team meanwhile and Mr. Baskin could have a minute to see where he wants to start.
(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
THE COURT: I may interrupt you and I may ask some questions along the way. Sorry in advance, but I'm going to probably do that. I'm all ears.

MR. BASKIN: All right. First, let me ask your Honor is my volume understandable or echoing anywhere?

THE COURT: No. I think it's working quite well at least for me right now. Ms. Robinson gave us a thumbs-up. She's happy and I'm happy and I'm happy that she's happy.

MR. BASKIN: I'll try to speak slowly which is my native tongue anyway. So as you could imagine, the background facts as Mr. Savitt laid them out are we're not exactly in agreement with all of that. This was -- this transaction is in the top five all-time worse merger and acquisition transactions of all time.

This was a $\$ 66$ billion cash deal rushed through, according to our pleading and in a fairly detailed pleading, for among other reasons to deal with the threat of an imminent takeover by Pfizer or some other shark as Mr. Savitt mentioned several times.

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At this point in 2016, the industry was undergoing a lot of $M \& A$ transactions. Bayer was at risk. Bayer was at risk. The story starts really with the former CEO Mr. Decker. Mr. Decker, as we plead, was against, very much against trying to take over Monsanto. There were already a number of health issues with Monsanto. World Health Organization already had declared its main product to be a carcinogenic product. There were career terrific problems.

We plead in some detail, not in just passing fashion, about how Pfizer had a big deal cooking. It blew up for tax reasons and within days, CEO Decker was out in a power struggle. The new CEO Baumann was in and within another ten days or so, he was in the office of Monsanto in Missouri with a $\$ 60$ million cash offer in hand. So this is not something that one can just wave away the entrenchment motive. The entrenchment allegations are made quite particularly.

Now, we also disagree about the New York contacts and how New York-centric the deal was. German board members were in Germany, yes, but the deal was proposed first in the United States. The deal was largely negotiated, according to the Monsanto proxy statement, in New York City. Bankers were in New York City and I will get to that point in just a moment. I'll sidetrack and speak to that.

The lawyers were in New York City and the
description of how the deal came together in the Monsanto proxy is Manhattan-centric. As I mentioned, they made it an all-cash offer and had to put out many billions of dollars of debt in order to make the acquisition. Much of that debt, $\$ 15$ billion initially, was New York-centric. It was put out --

THE COURT: You're client is not a debt holder, though, right?

MR. BASKIN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: So that debt to do the transaction, that's not what gives rise to your client's claim, right? That's not the complaint. It's the transaction itself and the alleged lack of diligence in connection with the transaction.

MR. BASKIN: It is really two things, your Honor. It's the entrenchment motive and the debt does play directly into that entrenchment motive. The way that they created sort of a poisoned pill was by creating \$50 billion worth of debt they didn't have before, an amount of debt that would be very unattractive to a suitor whereas before, they had very little debt and were very attractive to a suitor. In order to pull the deal together, they had to --

THE COURT: Are you saying that -- I just want to make sure I understand. Are you arguing that Bayer should have been acquired by someone else, that that was the

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mistake? Or is the mistake that this particular target in raising the debt was the problem meaning -- I guess what I'm trying to understand is the way that $I$ understood the gravamen of your complaint, it was that this company should never have been bought. This company had risks. It was this company that they should have known would have a problem with the herbicide that gave rise to the allegations that -- in the litigation and the substantial awards in California, but it wasn't the debt itself that caused the problem. In other words, if they had picked another company that didn't have these problems and taken on this debt, we might not be here today.

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                MR. BASKIN: I think that's fair to say, your
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Honor.

THE COURT: Right? Is that fair to say? MR. BASKIN: It is fair to say, but it's not fair to say that the debt is an issue that's off to the side. It is a culmination of rushing to the alter with a company with huge risks, with a background of two failed M\&A transactions already largely because of problems with due diligence creating the poison pill of $\$ 50$ billion worth of debt in order to buy this company and those two things work together.

Now, just buying Monsanto may not have been a poison pill and if that was the motivation or a very

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significant motivation, just buying Monsanto may not have done it. If they had done it with stock, for example, that may not have taken Bayer off the market. By doing it with debt, it took Bayer off the market and as chairman Werner admitted, it --

THE COURT: I don't understand that. Are you saying that that wouldn't have been diluted?

MR. BASKIN: If they had done a deal with stock, it would have been diluted, yes, but --

THE COURT: Right. So how would that have been different?

MR. BASKIN: An acquirer would not have had to take on debt. They could have done a stock for stock transaction. They could have financed it in other ways, but when there is pre-existing $\$ 50$ billion worth of debt, you're going to have to take the debt on one way or the other and that's a big bite to swallow.

THE COURT: Okay. I hear what you're saying. I'm not so sure $I$ see the distinction in that character of the compensation as it relates to the gravamen of your complaint, but keep going.

MR. BASKIN: Okay. Just the intrinsic motive and we have about 12 paragraphs early on starting from paragraph 22, I think, in the complaint about just that.

Let me back up just a moment and address the bank
identity issue.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. BASKIN: It may be that there were other bank entities that were engaged. Those letters don't negate the idea that there were the banks that we have sued, that those banks were involved. Again --

THE COURT: I haven't given Ms. Buchwald an opportunity to make that argument yet, so if that's where you want to start, that's okay. But, for the purposes of just noting for the record, she and I didn't develop that point really fully. I only let her weigh in on the 327 piece of how that argument fits in, but she didn't really get into that. But, we can develop that and if she feels like she wants to address it, she certainly can after you're finished with the rest of your comments.

But, go ahead. Talk to me about where you think in the complaint you make allegations as it relates to these particular defendants, that the documentary evidence doesn't utterly refute as it relates to each specific defendant. Let's go through the complaint that way.

MR. BASKIN: Let's start with Bank of America's Securities, Inc. and I'm sorry --

THE COURT: So let's -- that's NYSCEF 44 on the second amended complaint? MR. BASKIN: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: No problem. It is NYSCEF 44. Let me just pull it up and we can go through each one of these defendants. It is going to take a minute to load. I apologize. I wasn't expecting this to be our beginning, but it's fine. I'm not complaining.

MR. BASKIN: One of the reasons I'm going --
THE COURT: Give me a minute to pull it up. It is okay. You don't need to explain that to me. It is your case. You start anywhere you want. I'm here -- you may not like what I do you. You may like what I do. I don't know, but we will see where it goes. I think it is 64 of your complaint, right, where you talk about the -- page 64; is that right? Is that where it starts about Bank of America?

MR. BASKIN: Your Honor, my complaint is on my computer and I am not at my computer.

THE COURT: It is fine. It is paragraph 102, Bank of America Securities.

MR. BASKIN: Yes, Bank of America Securities, Inc.
THE COURT: Paragraph 102, Bank of America
Securities, Inc. and Bank of America Corporation.
MR. BASKIN: Right. Some of our information comes from the Monsanto proxy which of course is filed with the SCC and has some very detailed descriptions of what happened. There is considerable discussion about Merrill

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Lynch Pierce Fenn er \& Smith, Inc. being one of the primary due diligence banks on behalf of Bayer.

The reason I mention Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenn er
\& Smith, Inc. is because that entity became B of A
Securities, Inc. in a transaction after this deal. So
according to that proxy, Bank of America Securities, Inc. in its prior form was going back and forth in New York City doing due diligence, valuation work and the like. It is not a name that we picked out of nowhere. That's where that came from.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BASKIN: Bank of America Corporation is the parent and it picks up B of A Securities, Inc. and whichever other of the several hundred $B$ of $A$ entities were involved. The public paperwork talked about Bank of America and it talks about Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner \& Smith, Inc. The former being a broad designation that we tried to capture with corporation. The latter being a very specific New York-based corporation that according to the Monsanto proxy was heavily involved in the due diligence and negotiation of the deal. So that's where those came from.

Similarly, in the Monsanto proxy, there was discussion of Credit Suisse AG which is a specific Credit Suisse entity and that's where we drew that information from. Now, it may be that there was another Credit Suisse.

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They suggest the New York-based investment bank of Credit Suisse was involved. That is possibly true, but the fact that one was involved does not negate that Credit Suisse AG was involved as Monsanto said.

So we had very good reasons and unless the Monsanto proxy was simply wrong to name those entities, it may be that we have to name additional entities. But, by saying that Credit Suisse USA was involved does not negate that Credit Suisse AG was involved. The reason I went back there is that all of those entities, B of A Securities, Inc. is a New York entity. Credit Suisse --

THE COURT: Let me stop you. So the allegations in the complaint are as it relates to the bank defendants, are that they violated the German Corporation Act. That's what you tell me in your opposition papers, right?

MR. BASKIN: Correct.
THE COURT: Show me where in the complaint you tell me that that's what it is that you say that these particular bank defendants did.

MR. BASKIN: There is a particular paragraph, and I'm looking through my now scattered notes to find it, that alleges that Section 117 of the German Stock Corporation Act is alleged against all of the defendants.

THE COURT: Show me where. I see where you talk -- paragraph 143 of your complaint, where you review,

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cite the different portions of the German Corporation Act and what you say is as it relates to 117, exertion of influence of the company in paragraph 144, the corporate governance provisions of Section 161 of the German Stock Corporation Act also apply and control as the defendants were bound by Section 161.

MR. BASKIN: It is the 117 allegation, your Honor, against the bank and we say that that is made against all of these defendants.

THE COURT: Where do you say that, though, and where do you -- because Section 116 is the duty of care and responsibility of members of the supervisory board. And where do you say what it is that you think that they did as it relates to violating Section 117, what each one of these entities did? One of the things that the movants tell me is that you don't do that and I was looking and I had a lot of trouble finding it.

MR. BASKIN: Okay. The 117 allegation itself is in paragraph 143. Then --

THE COURT: 143? The one that $I$ just read you cite the statute for sure, but what is the allegation that provide legal basis for their liability? But, you don't tell me what it is that you did. Don't you have to do that factually? Don't you have to have a factual allegation that they violated the statute by doing or failing to do
something?
I mean, I understand where we are in the lawsuit, but don't you have to tell me that, what, by way of example, B of A Securities, Inc. did, they did this, they did that, they did the other thing, they provided -- they led the board to believe? Don't you have to -- by doing something?

MR. BASKIN: Starting at page 114, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BASKIN: Let me scroll down.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry.
MR. BASKIN: I know it is a lengthy complaint.
THE COURT: No, it is okay. We get them here all
the time. I know it is our first conversation on any case at all and I appreciate you -- your patience while we do this, but I think -- I hope you'll walk away feeling like okay, I got my day here, the Court took very seriously saying regardless of what $I$ end up doing page 114, right?

MR. BASKIN: Starting at paragraph 197, page 114.
THE COURT: Okay. Let me go there. In the wake of the great stock market crash of 1929?

MR. BASKIN: That's where the section starts.
THE COURT: That's where you want me to go, right, the exposure of wrongdoing.

MR. BASKIN: It identifies that the banks knew about Baumann and Werner's desire to avoid being in a

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position where they could be taken over. Going to Baumann and Werner, hoping to propose the deal, being financially compromised by having their compensation contingent upon the closing of the deal and failing in their due diligence in particular around the litigation risk. It has it in a number of paragraphs. I suppose it could have been condensed, but that's the nub of it. It encouraged the boards to do the deal.

THE COURT: Are you suggesting that any time a bank pitches a deal to a client, that they necessarily will have liability under Section 117?

MR. BASKIN: I'm not.
THE COURT: Okay. That's what I'm getting at.
What did these bank defendants do?
MR. BASKIN: When they pitch a bad deal that has an entrenchment motive and fail in the due diligence, all of which happening with their entire fee contingent on closing, that set of circumstances we believe states a 117 claim. THE COURT: Are you aware of a situation where the bank gets paid when a deal doesn't close?

MR. BASKIN: I am aware of situations where banks get partial fees and then success fees.

THE COURT: If they are retained as advisors, like an advisory fee? MR. BASKIN: Right.

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THE COURT: That's different than the pitch to deal example that I gave, right? Then they're retained for a particular -- like an investment bank is retained for a particular purpose and then so the -- I just want to understand the theory. The theory is that 117 creates liability whenever -- I'm not so sure I have to reach this, but I want to flesh out this point for the record. 117 creates liability for a bank whenever they go out and pitch a deal as opposed to when they are retained in an advisory capacity by a board. That's the theory?

MR. BASKIN: It is an aiding and abetting type of theory, your Honor, set out in different language because it is the way the German code works.

THE COURT: I see. Okay. That's the theory. Okay. Keep going.

MR. BASKIN: I'll move to another area where I heard some concern from the Court and that's the Section 1319 argument.

THE COURT: Well, I wasn't expressing concern over the notion. If you got the notion that I thought -- I think that just because there is an engagement letter, that necessarily is dispositive of the issue, I don't think that. But, that isn't my issue as it relates to the allegations here. I think there is a different problem as it relates to the allegations here.

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MR. BASKIN: As to the banks you say, your Honor?
THE COURT: Right. I'm not so sure I have to reach that and if I don't, then I'm not going to.

MR. BASKIN: Okay. Let me back up then and start with the internal affairs or Section 1319 issue. THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BASKIN: The cases and there are several trial level cases that have said the internal affairs doctrine should apply. Most of have not analyzed 1319 at all. The few that analyzed 1319 or mentioned it simply said well, 1319 is not a choice of law statute and they go no further than that in their analysis.

Again, I would suggest stepping back and saying if it is not a choice of law provision, what the heck is it? The provision is that, and it goes back to the 1920s, if a corporation, a foreign corporation is doing business in New York, you're going to be stuck with Section 626, Section 627 and a list of others. It is an unusual provision. We point out in our briefing that only two states, California and New York, have this kind of provision and a number of courts that have said what the provision does is reject the internal affairs doctrine, which after all is a common law doctrine, and has to give way to statutory law where it operates.

THE COURT: Don't I have to respect the law in

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another jurisdiction as it relates to the state of incorporation and what laws govern the way the internal affairs of that corporation work?

MR. BASKIN: I think the analysis, and we set out the restatement of conflicts that says this, where this state, where New York has a statutory choice of law, it must be respected.

THE COURT: I don't know that this is a conflict of law issue as it relates to this question. I think I told you that I think you're conflating two different concepts, which is the subject matter jurisdiction and --

MR. BASKIN: Let me tell you where $I$ think it does matter, your Honor. So Mr. Savitt argued quite a bit about the registered stock issue.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. BASKIN: I'll have some other --
THE COURT: Because it is a derivative thing.
MR. BASKIN: Right.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. BASKIN: Under 626, either an owner or a beneficial owner of stock has the right to sue.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. BASKIN: Mr. Savitt is saying well, forget that. In Germany, a beneficial owner doesn't have the right to sue, a beneficial owner being an owner of stock whose

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stock is held by an intermediary. So there, you have a question does New York law apply or does German law apply.

You have 1319 saying this corporation is going to be subject to Section 626 which is specific ownership for standing. The German law actually we think is not that different because the new provisions recognizing intermediaries as owners, but if there were a difference, New York law would trump based on that statute as opposed to the common law choice of law provisions.

THE COURT: I hear what you're saying. I can't say that I agree with you, but I hear what you're saying.

MR. BASKIN: It's hard to say, your Honor, where 1319 has any effect at all unless it has that effect. It is hard to say --

THE COURT: Because if there wasn't a substantive law impediment from another jurisdiction, you wouldn't have the right to sue necessarily in New York as an individual owner and you can and the long arm statute gives the court jurisdiction over even a derivative action of a foreign corporation provided that you can satisfy either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction, or you can satisfy statutory requirements, but to have the individual come forward, that's right.

I can't agree with your analysis. I would not have had to address the fraud on the minority exception in

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the Renren case. I wouldn't have had to do that and you would be displacing the substantive law of every other jurisdiction if that were the case and New York is a powerful state. It is an important state, but it is not that powerful.

MR. BASKIN: With respect -- I'd ask the Court to look at the German American Coffee case that Justice Cardozo wrote so many years ago where he said basically yes, we are and when we say that our law applies, that was specifically in the context of New Jersey law, and it was a New Jersey incorporated company, says only the shareholders get to bring a dividend case.

New York law said well, the company can bring it and Justice Cardozo looked at it and said they have come to New York. They have consented and that's a big part of it, is their consent to being bound by the particular New York laws, 1319 and its predecessors 626, 627 and their predecessors and that helps explain. And that German American Coffee case goes into some depth about this entire consent which is why at least Justice Cardozo and his successors explained --

THE COURT: Sure. I understand what it is that you're saying and under the circumstances, I understand what you're saying.

MR. BASKIN: Okay. Let me then go through the

German law. A couple of comments first. Mr. Savitt said over and over that there is a parallel case in Germany. There is not. There is no derivative case in Germany. That's a securities case alleging different things about the same transaction against different people. So it is not -- there is a parallel derivative case for breach of fiduciary duty happening in Germany. There is not. If this case doesn't go forward, there will be no derivative case in Europe.

THE COURT: Tell me why that's necessarily the case. Why is that necessarily the case and if this case doesn't go forward -- well, let's address why you think that's not the case and let's start with that.

MR. BASKIN: Okay. So we go to Section 148 of the German code and if you look at the structure of Section 148, it is all about asking permission of the German court to bring a case in the German court.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. BASKIN: There's nothing in there about asking permission in the German court to bring a case elsewhere. The prerequisites are the prerequisites to bringing the petition for permission, not explicitly prerequisites for bringing the damage case.

THE COURT: Doesn't the certificate of formation require the case to be brought in Germany?

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MR. BASKIN: It does not because a derivative case is not a case between shareholders and company. It is a case in which where the shareholders in the company or effectively on the same side. There is a second reason.

German law gives way to European Union Law and there is a large body of European law and Professor Mankowski is one of the leading authorities in Europe on European law and how European law is an overlay to national law in Europe and the national -- the countries have to comport themselves with European law.

As he says, this kind of case cannot be an exclusive jurisdiction case in an EU country. There's a fairly detailed explanation in his affidavit about why that is. Moreover, he says Germany does not and cannot dictate to other EU countries what their procedure would be. Therefore, just as a matter of European law, a German company derivative case could be brought in another EU country and that EU country would apply its own procedural law whether it had a permission requirement or not.

Now, the same is true here. It is not exclusively German both because of the reading of that part of the charter, but also because that overlay of European law. By definition, it cannot be exclusively German.

Now, if you look at the 148 provision, it says if you do these things, we'll entertain your request for

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permission, your petition for permission. And if we grant your petition for permission, you have to bring your case here in that same court. So it doesn't have extraterritorial effect. It cannot have extraterritorial effect and the way the statute is written does not say if you take your case to France or some other EU country, you have to meet these prerequisites. It is just not in the statute, just not statute.

Let me talk about some of those. The registered stock issue, all the stock at Bayer is registered stock. Now, there is a question of who is the person appearing on the registration list. In Germany, based on the way they hold stock there, it generally is the holder, so you get a stock certificate. You put it in your sock drawer and they have a list that you've got your name, your birthday and everything.

Seven years ago, Europe -- again, the EU was having a difficulty with cross-border stock ownership issues and it issued some guidelines which resulted in German legislation in 2017. The whole purpose of the European Union guidelines, directives, actually directives to all its membered countries was to make it easy for the ultimate shareholder to exercise shareholder rights no matter which of the five kinds of stock ownership models were followed.

Now, in the United States, most shareholders of

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listed companies hold their shares through the DTC and CD \& Company. That's just the way it is. And France, there's a different listing and holding convention. There are five of them. Professor Mankowski goes through them. The European directive was to make it clear that however you held your stock, if you were the shareholder, you were the shareholder and you got to exercise your shareholder rights.

And that's what resulted in the 2017 legislation recognizing that those who held through intermediaries, which is what our clients are, were shareholders with full shareholder rights.

The Section 67 was amended. We will tell your Honor that the translation given the Court of the new Section 67 is not accurate. It was amended to reflect that the shares had to be in the registry, but not the individual end shareholder. None of the rest of the statute would make sense if that were so and the German word for shareholder does not appear in the sentence that has it. It is a little bit of a nuance, but German law simply, the old law required registered shareholders.

Now, the new law, because the European directive allows shareholders who hold through intermediaries. It is kind of boring, but it's the law and that's where we are on that one. To say that you have to be a German with your stock certificate in your sock drawer to sue is just not

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right and it would be discriminatory not only against U.S. holders, but against holders in other countries in Europe which the EU just won't do.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BASKIN: Moving to the next issue, again, it is the permission statute. It is not a statute having to do with explicitly with standing to bring the damage suit. It is a statute explicitly having to do with the permission which is only in Germany, so the contemporaneous ownership issue. Their real argument is that while you're not a registered stockholder, therefore, you're not contemporaneous and you had to be registered before you learned of the bad acts. There's nothing in the German law that says that.

THE COURT: I don't know -- they say you need to be an owner $I$ think is the way they put it, but putting that aside, I had asked you why isn't this case going forward in Germany. That was my question, remember, just to refocus our conversation. You can go back to this, but I'm very curious why you say the derivative action couldn't go forward in Germany.

MR. BASKIN: Let me say that very few derivative actions have gone forward at all since 2005 when the statute was passed. The overall reason is that there's a fee shifting provision that if you don't get permission, you

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have -- the shareholder has to pay for the companies and the defendant's fees in seeking permission. Secondly -THE COURT: You're saying that because during the course of the litigation, your clients would have to bear the cost of the litigation if it were brought in Germany, the case doesn't go forward? But, if we come to New York where defendants have to lift their own bell along the way, we can go forward and, therefore, this Court should take that into consideration?

MR. BASKIN: I think the Court should take it into consideration. Why one should ask with all that has happened in the German corporate world over the last several years, all of the scandals, why is there no derivative litigation? Because the statute is set up with significant disincentives to bring derivative litigation there.

I think Professor Mankowski said since 2005, there have been two, two derivative cases brought in Germany under Section 148. That's not for lack of bad acts or bad actors I would suggest. It is for extreme incentives because look, the plaintiff doesn't get anything personally and the plaintiff puts himself, herself significantly at risk by bringing the case in Germany. It's --

THE COURT: Well, unless the risk calculus is such that they have a claim or they have made the demand and the corporation has deemed it in the best interest of the

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corporation to bring the derivative action and to incur the cost, right?

MR. BASKIN: Certainly, the company can say yes, we will take over this action. We could say in the U.S. even with very meritorious suits, that rarely ever happens. It rarely happens because --

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. BASKIN: -- the directors having to say we made a mistake --

THE COURT: But isn't that the whole point of the advisory, though, here, to watch over the board and to make that decision?

MR. BASKIN: The point of the demand here is to give the board the chance to correct the problem.

THE COURT: Isn't that what the advisory -- there are two boards, right? So one board is supposedly --

MR. BASKIN: Actually, we disagree with that, too. Yes, there is a board of supervisors and a board of managers. There's nothing in the German statute suggesting the board of managers which is really another word for the management team, the CEO, the CFO, the people who operate the company. There's nothing in the German statute giving them the right to go bring suit against the board of supervisors. And imagine since --

THE COURT: That doesn't make sense. Why would

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they?
MR. BASKIN: That's not their job, is to bring a suit against the supervisors, the people that hired them. German law doesn't require suicide missions and what they're saying --

THE COURT: Neither does New York.
MR. BASKIN: Right. They're saying three of the -- the three junior executive members of the management team, I guess they are saying, should have teamed up and said we're going to sue Werner Baumann and Vinna [sic] and all the board of supervisors for the deal that was sort of the crowning achievement for good or for bad of their careers. And which, by the way, even before we filed the suit, management and the supervisors had heavily defended the deal.

Here's a point. At a shareholder meeting, the shareholders voted a vote of no confidence against management. Never happened in German corporate history before. 55 percent voted no confidence based on this deal and they still said we don't care. We think it is a great deal. We're going forward. So the idea that the board of managers --

THE COURT: Sounds look a very compelling argument to make to the court in Germany as to why the suit should go forward, right?

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MR. BASKIN: If someone wants to stand up and take on that burden with the fee shifting and the other problem going forward in Germany, fine. Our clients are not and I have not seen anybody else do that. If there are actually parallel litigations there, if there are actually a derivative case there, in this case, $I$ mean, one being one of the worse M\&A deals with the loss of 50 or $\$ 60$ billion in market cap, if that doesn't get a derivative case in Germany, what will? What will?

THE COURT: Wouldn't it be interesting to find out?

MR. BASKIN: Well -- but who's going to risk it? THE COURT: Isn't this -- isn't this the test case?

MR. BASKIN: It could be the test case if there was somebody willing to take that expense and that risk for no personal gain for themselves. The incentive structure is set up, so that it is virtually unheard of.

THE COURT: So you're asking me to hold that as a matter of law that Germany does not provide an adequate forum for derivative actions involving German companies because the cost of maintaining those actions in Germany is an effective barred litigation? That's what you're asking me to do. And I can tell you right now there are no chances of that happening today here at 60 Centre Street, period.

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MR. BASKIN: I understand that, your Honor. But, not as a matter of law, but as a matter of fact and practicality, we have history --

THE COURT: Let's talk about forum non. Let's talk about personal jurisdiction and forum non and let's -- we have to get to the heart of what's likely to be the critical issues that I need to consider at this stage of the litigation.

MR. BASKIN: Right. Indulge me for a moment.
THE COURT: It is okay. Take your time. We have time.

MR. BASKIN: Personal jurisdiction, we largely agree on. On the agency theory --

THE COURT: Let's do the Kreutter discussion. So that's where I go back to my concerns particularly as it relates to the bank defendants as to the specific allegations to satisfy Kreutter. Don't you need them?

MR. BASKIN: I think we -- personal jurisdiction, these are New York residents that we have sued.

THE COURT: Well, you said on the agency theory.
I thought we were talking about --
MR. BASKIN: With regard to the Germans, their agents in New York.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I apologize. I apologize. Go ahead.

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MR. BASKIN: As to the banks that we have sued, they are New York residents or banks with heavy, heavy New York --

THE COURT: I understand that. You don't need to spend time on that. I misspoke.

MR. BASKIN: Okay. As to the Germans, we go back and recall there are only two basic sets of allegations. One, the entrenchment allegations and second, the terrible due diligence allegation and really we think they go hand in hand if one is so enthrall of making the deal in order to create a poison pill, in order to entrench. One might not ask the hard questions even though the hard questions about legal risk are out there to be seen. Everybody says how did they miss the legal risk. How did they end up in a situation where $\$ 50$ billion of market cap is lost.

Effectively, the entire purchase price of Monsanto is lost in terms of market cap because of legal risk that should have been much better identified during due diligence. And if there were no entrenchment motive should have been identified as a deal stopper during due diligence particularly when it was over a two-year period. There were various points, and we identify in the complaint, when a board and management should have said this is too risky. We don't know enough. We can't finalize the deal.

Now, who was doing the due diligence? Lawyers in

New York, bankers in New York. German supervisors weren't doing it themselves. They had obligations, but they had the bankers and the lawyers do it. Maybe took too much from Monsanto itself. The description --

THE COURT: Wasn't their analysis done in Germany?
If they were dissatisfied with -- wasn't their alleged failure when they reviewed whatever materials came to them, the failure to ask questions and say hey, this is not sufficient? This doesn't answer our question. I mean, they certainly would not be meeting their obligations by blindly accepting whatever materials came in and whatever recommendations they may have gotten from their third-party professionals, right? They'd have to do their own analysis to meet their own duty of care.

MR. BASKIN: There's no indication they did so.
THE COURT: That's not what I'm asking, though. That analysis, that what the board did, didn't that take place in Germany?

MR. BASKIN: What the board did or didn't do?
THE COURT: Right. Or didn't do. I'm sorry. I wasn't trying to --

MR. BASKIN: To be sure, most of the supervisors were in Germany. Although, the chairman and the CEO were often in New York, closed the deal in New York.

THE COURT: The fact that the papers were
exchanged in -- so the due diligence on this company that is not a New York-based company took place presumably, as it relates to that company, by the professionals by reviewing the company's records, war, that was set up for the company, all of that sort of a thing in the context of the M\&A deal and I'm just --

MR. BASKIN: All of that was in New York. All of that was in New York.

THE COURT: Well, except for the board didn't meet in New York. It didn't go to the war room. It didn't do any of that in New York. It -- I'm uncompelled by the raising of the debt argument. That, to me, is a non-starter, but as it relates to the -- in terms of contacts because I don't think that that gives rise to the same things that you do for all of the reasons we discussed at the beginning of our colloquy.

But, as it relates to the diligence and the decision making of the board which forms the gravamen of your complaint, I think that the -- if the board met in New York less the transaction in New York, if the board regularly got together in New York, then we would be talking about the kinds of contacts that would have given rise to your allegations.

The fact that reports were prepared here and experts come from here as it relates to a company outside of

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New York and then was sent off to Germany for review and determination and approval in meeting their fiduciary responsibilities under German law, I'm having trouble understanding why that's a New York contact for the purposes of this analysis.

Because let's say by way of example, and I don't obviously have the discovery or whatever. Let's say that one of the advisors highlighted the potential risk in your best case scenario and the board went ahead and made a decision anyway to go forward.

That's your extremely right now as it relates to evidence supporting your client's claim, very happy. Let's say it is the opposite. That there was nothing that was disclosed to this board, but the report specifically didn't investigate certain things and it specifically says in the report we didn't do -- we didn't look at this or that or the other thing, this product and one of the products they didn't look at is the one that caused all of the issues. And in doing the moonshot, the decision not to go back to the advisor and say no, you need to get information about that is really what this ultimately comes down to.

That decision isn't made here is what I keep coming back here. That decision is made in Germany. That's what you're really upset about, right, is that the supervisors didn't ask enough questions or when they did

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answer the questions, got answers to their questions, the questions that they got were so unsatisfactory, right, that they could not have reasonably gone forward with the transaction and meeting their duty of care under the circumstances, right? That's essentially what you're saying.

MR. BASKIN: What I'm saying is that people doing the due diligence were their agents and 302 talks about agents. It doesn't require the supervisors to have been physically in New York as they were performing that function.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BASKIN: Some of the questions you're raising are very good questions, but they're questions for discovery including, if necessary, jurisdictional discovery. Your positing this and you're positing that.

THE COURT: I'm just asking you questions as to where you think the injury took place is really what I'm getting at.

MR. BASKIN: The injury took place in New York because that's where the due diligence was done. That's where speaking to some of the forum non conveniens issues, the documents are on due diligence, the witnesses are on due diligence, where the discovery would be done on due diligence, and due diligence is really very much at the
center of the case.
THE COURT: Okay. Keep going. Then I'm going to let Ms. Buchwald address what she didn't get a chance to address and then I'm probably going to think about this for a little bit.

MR. BASKIN: Okay. I could speak for sometime on doing business aspect of 1319. I have a sense the Court is not particularly interested in that right now.

THE COURT: I respectfully disagree. As it relates to the interplay and whether or not the internal affairs doctrine has been set aside by statute, I don't agree with that. The law is settled.

MR. BASKIN: I hear you. I will agree to disagree.

THE COURT: That's why I said we will agree to disagree.

MR. BASKIN: On demand futility, I will be quick on that. We meet the Marx test. We meet the HSBC test. Is there really some reasonable chance that they could have acted impartially? More than that, by the time this lawsuit was filed, we met the common sense test with the board and supervisors already having been challenged on the transaction at the annual meeting, already having withstood a vote of no confidence, and already having said we hear you, we disagree, we're not going to do anything.

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We have a number of paragraphs in the complaint starting at paragraph 287 about demand excused, but that really is the nub of it. As to the forum non conveniens factors, again, there is no parallel suit. There is no real realistic possibility of this suit going forward in Germany. History shows it both specific to this case and over the last 16 years since the derivative device was passed in Germany.

I think the other factors particularly with the New York plaintiff and the difficulty of throwing a case out on forum non conveniens grounds with a New York plaintiff, they have simply not met the test. I think this is a good point for me to pass and I may have a couple of closing comments, but the if the Court has any further questions, I will be happy to entertain them.

THE COURT: I don't. I think that the big issues that I will be thinking about relate to forum non and jurisdiction.

All right, Ms. Buchwald. I am all ears. It is your turn. You have been very patient. I appreciate that. So do your colleagues.

MS. BUCHWALD: Thank you, your Honor. Can you hear me okay?

THE COURT: I'm good.
MS. BUCHWALD: For the record, Lara Samet Buchwald

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from Davis Polk \& Wardwell on behalf of Bank of America Corporation and B of A Securities, Inc. I am with Joe Kurtzberg from Cahill Gordon \& Reindel on behalf of Credit Suisse AG and Credit Suisse Group AG. And for efficiency purposes because our motions were made together, I'll be arguing. But, if Credit Suisse has specific questions, Mr. Kurtzberg is here and will be happy to answer them.

I want to start with the wrong entity issue in part because I think it is a gating one. Starting with the Bank of America entities, Bayer engaged two entities. It was Bank of America Merrill Lynch International or BAMLI, which is a U.K. entity and a Frankfurt branch of that U.K. entity and they engaged DSP Merrill Lynch which is an Indian entity. Those entities weren't named as defendants. They are not here. I don't represent them.

But instead, plaintiffs named the two entities that are on the caption. They named Bank of America Corporation which is the ultimate parent which doesn't provide advisory services generally and wasn't engaged to provide advisory services here. And they named B of $A$ Securities, Inc. which is a New York sub of BAC which, again, wasn't engaged in provide any services here.

There was a similar pattern with respect to Credit Suisse. Only one Credit Suisse entity was engaged. That's Credit Suisse Securities USA, L.L.C., but instead, the

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plaintiffs named two Swiss entities, Credit Suisse AG and Credit Suisse Group AG.

I want to pause on that point because while plaintiff keeps saying they engaged New York banks, the Credit Suisse defendants in particular are Swiss and they made a personal jurisdiction motion as well.

THE COURT: Right.
MS. BUCHWALD: And so the --
THE COURT: Just to focus where I think
this -- you could provide some clarity for the record -MS. BUCHWALD: Sure.

THE COURT: -- so one of the things that Mr.
Baskin discussed was he said in the Monsanto papers, they identify the predecessor and interest to your client as having been an advisor on the transaction. Can we look at what he attaches to his papers, which I think is NYSCEF 170, and we can take a look at that and you could help me understand? I think -- go ahead.

MS. BUCHWALD: It is 170 and $I$ have it open. It is pages 31 and 32 by the proxy page numbers is what I'm looking at.

THE COURT: Give me one second.
MS. BUCHWALD: Sure.
THE COURT: Do you have the PDF number or no?
MS. BUCHWALD: The PDF number --
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THE COURT: It is okay if you don't.

MS. BUCHWALD: At the bottom of the page, it looks like it is 38 of 194 and 39 of 194. Would that help? I have it open electronically.

THE COURT: We'll see. Give me one second. So the bottom of the page, I have -- you said 38?

MS. BUCHWALD: 38 of 194 is at the bottom.
THE COURT: Sure. I'm right there. 38 of 194.
MS. BUCHWALD: So I think a couple of threshold points before we get to NYSCEF 170. I want to make sure I adequately explain what our thinking is before we get there. The first is the buyer engaged the banks and those engagement letters are in the record. They are clear. They're unambiguous. Not Monsanto.

Number two is that there is a whole wealth of case law out there that talks about, for example, the use of trade names and how that in and of itself isn't sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. What this argument really is nobody is using the word, but it is a veil piercing argument that they're trying to advocate to bring in affiliates and parents as --

THE COURT: I'm not sure -- see, I thought that, too, when I first read the papers and that's why I think that going through the statement here on when it was issued and all of that is important because he points to Merrill

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Lynch Pierce Fenner \& Smith, Inc., and then he defines it B of A, Merrill Lynch. He says that's really your client is what he says to me.

Right, Mr. Baskin?
Just to make sure I'm not missing because I want you to address this and I want to make sure I got this.

Right, Mr. Baskin, that's what you're essentially looking at?

MR. BASKIN: Yes, specific Merrill Lynch Pierce \& Fenner, Inc. which became in a reorganization $B$ of $A$ Securities, Inc.

THE COURT: I got it. So that's what he's looking at and he says well, look, this statement was -- went out and here is the detail of the transaction. That necessarily means that your client was involved.

MS. BUCHWALD: Yes, and, your Honor, what I would say is this. We have a June 25th conversation where Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner \& Smith, Inc. is then defined as B of A Merrill Lynch. You also have on the next page a July 16th conversation where Credit Suisse AG is defined as Credit Suisse.

THE COURT: One second. B of A Credit and Suisse AG. Sure. Got it.

MS. BUCHWALD: Again, I think the important point is Monsanto didn't engage any of the defendant banks. It

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was buyer that engaged them. And then with respect to these specific conversations, there are two conversations that are being identified which aren't anywhere in the complaint.

THE COURT: Well, that's a different issue, right? That's what $I$ was getting at in terms of the specific factual allegations, right?

MS. BUCHWALD: And your Honor, I think that's important, right, because what we get to it essentially and I understand this is the way that you were looking at it, but it is certainly the way we are looking at it, which is that we have a complaint that names these four bank defendants and we have the engagement letters that make abundantly clear that none of those four were ever engaged to do this work.

THE COURT: That proves too much, right? That doesn't necessarily mean that other entities didn't provide advisory services. The fact that the engagement
letters -- that argument respectfully, I don't think that that gets you where you need to get to. But, it's certainly prima facie evidence that these were the specific entities that were engaged for the purpose. But, I don't think you necessarily get to say hey, look, no one else was involved period, full stop, based on these letters.

MS. BUCHWALD: I think the important point is this was never pleaded and so you have an excerpt of a proxy

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attached to an opposition brief and they're trying to use that as a basis to belt and suspenders their naming of defendants in the pleading.

We don't think that's an appropriate way to do it. We don't think it circumvents their other pleading failures. And to make a clearer point about it, I want to quickly go to what I think is our 3211(a) (7) prong, the absence of allegations against the bank defendants, because I think --

THE COURT: We -- I talked about that with Mr. Baskin, the fact that he cites the statute and says that liability arises under the statute without specifically telling me which bank did what. I think that's a problem. Even under notice pleading standard, I think that that's a problem.

MS. BUCHWALD: Your Honor, we do, too. I think paragraph 143 to which they point which just has a block quote of the statute doesn't in any way put us on notice. But, I think we would go one step forward to say notice isn't the touchdown. It is actually particularity because these are fiduciary claims which require a heightened level of pleading.

There is another technical piece of this as well which is if you look at CPLR 3016, and when you talk about the absence of tying it together, 3016 (e) says that when you rely on foreign law, it has to be expressly stated in

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the pleading. And while they have the one block quote, there is nothing in there and I have done multiple reads through this complaint to try to find it.

There's nothing in there that says Section 117 is our doctrinal hook for our claim against the banks. It is just not there and so we think that's a real problem, which kind of leads us to a bit of head scratching, right. What are their claims and what are they trying to say and I would -- at least I heard three things maybe from plaintiffs earlier. The first is that there is some sort of per se conflict of interest when financial institutions perform both advisory work and financing work.

THE COURT: That doesn't work.
MS. BUCHWALD: It doesn't work. It doesn't work
under New York law. They cite Delaware law. It doesn't work under Delaware law either.

THE COURT: It is just not the way deals are done.
MS. BUCHWALD: Exactly. Exactly.
THE COURT: I understand.
MS. BUCHWALD: The second claim that they seem to
say well, we got 117 and all that requires is exerted
influence and we've pleaded that. We don't think they've pleaded that each of those four entities exerted any influence, number one.

Number two, and this is a point that we made in

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our reply, they haven't cited a German law expert for anything with respect to Section 117. They --

THE COURT: That's the problem, too, isn't it?
MS. BUCHWALD: There's not a single sentence about
117. There is not a single sentence about the law, about the claims against the banks.

And then you get to the third problem with 117 is we actually think they misquoted. The interpretation that they cite which has a standard of exert influence is quite different from the German interpretation that we have seen which requires that it be an intentional compulsion.

THE COURT: Yeah, I don't know that I could resolve that discrepancy between the experts at this stage, but I understand what you're saying.

MS. BUCHWALD: And I acknowledge that and I think that part of that points to the forum non analysis, right? We have all of these conflicting interpretations of what German law should be and how it should be construed and we are left with a whole bunch of what are they claiming against us and what are we supposed to do about it. So it is a bit of shadow-boxing to try to respond to each of the arguments.

I do want to respond quickly to two quick points on forum non. I recognize we already covered the waterfront, but let me make two points. First was the point
that Germany isn't an adequate forum for shareholder derivative cases. I think Mr. Savitt covered that well in his citation to the Porsche case, which is the Viking case, was spot on.

But, I think the Porsche case is illustrative for the point that that has been proceeded on to shareholder derivative litigation in Germany right now. It is a matter of public record. It is still going on. And so while I'm not a German law expert and obviously buyer's German law expert has said many things about what is going on in Germany, that case not only stands for the proposition that a German forum is adequate, it also proves or disproves the point that there are no German shareholder litigations going on.

The second point on forum non that $I$ wanted to make is $I$ heard a number of times during this argument that all the diligence happened in New York, all the diligence happened in New York. Respectfully, that's nowhere in the second amended complaint. And other than the handful of references in the proxy to which were referenced, which identify a U.S. entity, we don't see anything that supports that argument.

And so instead what we're left with are three dozen defendants, the vast majority who are overseas defendants. We are left with boards that operated in

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Germany. We're left with a German forum that's perfectly well-equipped to do this. And I think one of the things that I do when I try to reconcile the various German law declarations, I see a very specific, very intentional, very planful statute trying to prescribe how these litigations are to be handled. And so I'm happy to answer any questions your Honor has, but trying not to tread over ground that others have already covered.

THE COURT: That's fine.
Mr. Savitt, was there anything that you wanted to address before I let Mr. Baskin say one more thing?

MR. SAVITT: Only very briefly, your Honor. Thank you for the Court's indulgence. Picking up on a point or two that my colleague just made, first to say the Porsche case really is a huge obstacle and it has become even more so listening to Mr. Baskin present his case.

Ms. Buchwald is entirely correct. There is a derivative action. Mr. Baskin drew a lot of attention in his discussion with the Court to the fact that the plaintiff here or one of them is a New York resident. So, too, in Porsche was a New York resident. First Department ruled that Germany was an appropriate forum and it was. And the real point about the parallel proceedings even in this case are that you can go to Germany. Relief is available in Germany and boiled all the way down, plaintiff's case on

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forum non is to say that Porsche was decided wrong and it wasn't as a practical matter and certainly wasn't as a matter of law.

It is the law of the First Department and it bears observation that to the extent what's being said here is we need to export U.S. litigation on German fiduciary matters by importing German defendants. That's exactly the proposition that the sixth forum non-factor is designed to obviate. As a matter of comity and respect, Germany is a sovereign state. It has an advanced economy of course. It has elaborate and well-respected corporate governance devices and they do provide an alternative forum.

THE COURT: I just keep coming back to this case strikes me as exactly what Judge Nathan was concerned about in the Holzman case as it relates to just a single unconnected step in a series of different things that happened, but where the gravamen of the real harm happened elsewhere. I just --

MR. SAVITT: I think that's entirely right and the only other observation I wanted to make is and it follows on the Court's remarks is it connects a little more with the Kreutter analysis is to say that this case is about what the board of Bayer did or didn't do.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. SAVITT: That board did or didn't do what it

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did or didn't do in Germany. There is --
THE COURT: It didn't come here to do it. I mean, that's what's so critically important, I think, as it relates to this case is that they didn't come here to close the -- the board didn't show up in New York and meet and go through the war room and that's not what happened here. That's just not what's alleged.

MR. SAVITT: It is not what's alleged because it couldn't be alleged. It didn't happen. If the Court has questions, we are happy --

THE COURT: I really don't. I just don't see that in doing this deal -- I'm going to think about it, Mr. Baskin. I'm going to let you say what you want to say to me, but $I$ question seriously whether or not you have personal jurisdiction over the individual Bayer sup- -- I don't respectfully question it, but I'm substantially concerned about this case being litigated here in New York because I don't think it belongs here.

There isn't the kind of purposeful availment of the New York forum as it relates to the specific harm that you're alleging, sir. Our nexus is very small. We have a very, very low interest in this case and the burden of this Court is -- would be substantial in managing this litigation. All right, Mr. Baskin, I'll hear what you have to say.


#### Abstract

PROCEEDINGS MR. BASKIN: I will wrap up fairly quickly. First of all, I'd say again that German law is explicitly non-exclusive, non-exclusive. They don't pretend to have an exclusive hold on these cases. Secondly, this transaction did close in New York. Virtually everything that happened in terms of the due diligence happened in New York. The agency leg of personal jurisdiction either --


THE COURT: You said closed in New York. Let's get more granular. So Monsanto, where are they located? MR. BASKIN: Missouri.

THE COURT: So when the consideration flowed from Bayer, where did it flow to?

MR. BASKIN: Flowed to New York.
THE COURT: Where did it flow to ultimately?
MR. BASKIN: Most of the consideration was in the form of these bonds and notes raised primarily here in New York and it flowed through --

THE COURT: Where the money came from isn't the issue. The issue is where did it go to.

MR. BASKIN: It went through the New York closing bank ultimately to the former shareholders of Monsanto all around the country.

THE COURT: All around the country, right.
MR. BASKIN: All around the country --
THE COURT: All around the country.

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THE COURT: They own stock now of Monsanto, right? MR. BASKIN: Correct.

THE COURT: And that's held where?
MR. BASKIN: That's a metaphysical question, your Honor.

THE COURT: It's not metaphysical to me. This didn't happen here. The fact that the lawyers are located here, so what. I mean, we've got -- I'd like to say with respect to California, London, Paris, Germany and all over the world, that the comm/fed bar and the members of the comm/fed bar located in New York, amongst the finest lawyers anywhere in the world. It is of no -- it is of no significance that they happen to have hired the best and the brightest to me as it relates to this particular transaction. That's not -- that's not the criteria.

I'm going to think about this, Mr. Baskin. I told you I would. We are going to get together again in this case. I'm going to have Mr. Savitt order a copy of the transcript because he took the lead on this one and he's going to send it to me and we'll get together and we are at

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December 13th. I guess we will have to get together after the new year at this point because Ms. Robinson is very, very busy and I don't want to -- how is like January -- I don't want to impose on anybody if they have holiday plans, but either end of first full week or beginning of second week of January, whatever is more convenient for you, Mr. Baskin, your colleagues and the defendants' lawyers. I'm going to be doing pain client work regardless, so you tell me and we will see if that works for them.

MR. BASKIN: Any of those dates are fine.
THE COURT: How is January 6th?
MR. BASKIN: January 6th is fine for me. I'd like Mr. Robert to be available. Robert, how is January 6th in the afternoon.

MR. ROBERT: January 6th works for me.
MR. SAVITT: I was going to ask if the loth or
11th would work.
THE COURT: Make sure. You want the 10th in the afternoon?

MR. ROBERT: I can do the 10 th.
MR. BASKIN: 10th is fine for me.
THE COURT: Mr. Robert is not available, so that doesn't work.

MR. ROBERT: I can do the 10th, your Honor. Just not the 11th, sir.
PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: 2:30 on the 10th?
MR. ROBERT: Yes.
THE COURT: Ms. Buchwald?
MS. BUCHWALD: I'll make it work.
THE COURT: Very accommodating. I appreciate our long discussion this morning. Thank you all for bearing with me and your patience. You all are terrific and I greatly appreciate you letting me ask my questions. Thank you.

> MR. SAVITT: Thank you.
MR. BASKIN: Thank you.
MS. BUCHWALD: Thank you.
CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF THE ORIGINAL MINUTES TAKEN OF THIS PROCEEDING.


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