

Outlook for oil prices in 2019 Mid-year update

JOHN KEMP REUTERS 5 June 2019


Brent crude price expected to average around \$65 per barrel in 2019 Forecasts tightly clustered, price not expected to rise much through 2023



Brent has averaged \$67 so far this year, down from \$72 in 2018 Real prices are (just) in the top half of the distribution since 1973




Brent six-month calendar spread in significant backwardation Traders expect market to be mildly under-supplied in H2 2019 and into 2020



Price difference between 1st listed contract month and 7th listed contract month for Brent futures (U.S.\$/bbl)
Contango (-) or backwardation (+) averaged over 30 days

Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon, ICE Futures @JKempEnergy


Brent spot price and spreads recently pointed in opposite directions Slumping spot prices point to over-supply, tight spreads point to under-supply



Spot prices and spreads will have to converge Spreads currently softening

Cyclical indicators in the oil market, 2007-2019

Brent crude: front-month futures prices and calendar spreads



- --- L-axis: Brent front-month futures prices (percent change year-on-year)
- -R-axis: Brent calendar spread (1st month 7th month future price, U.S.\$ per bbl)

Both series are averaged over 30 trading days to smooth short-term volatility

@JKempEnergy

Brent calendar spread has eased substantially in recent sessions Extreme tightness concentrated in Jun-Jul-Aug, result of pipeline problem etc

Shape of the futures price curve in Brent crude Contango (-) or backwardation (+) from months 1 to 7 (US\$/bbl)



Price difference Brent month 1 and month 7 (U.S.\$/bbl) Source: ICE Futures, @JKempEnergy Contango (-) or backwardation (+)

Principal influences on oil prices in 2019

External variables (mostly independent of oil prices)

- (1) Global economy
 - ❖ U.S./China trade war
 - Financial conditions
 - Global business cycle
 - Oil-exporting countries
 - Commodity-dependent economies

Internal variables (mostly dependent on oil prices)


- (2) U.S. shale production growth
 - * Reaction to lower prices
- (3) OPEC+ output reductions
 - * Reaction to lower prices
 - Group discipline
 - Trump pressure
- (4) U.S. sanctions on Iran
 - * Renewal of waivers
 - Availability of replacement bbl
 - Price impact
- (5) U.S. sanctions on Venezuela
 - * Availability of replacement bbl

Global economic growth has slowed sharply over the last year OECD leading indicator has fallen to level normally associated with recession

OECD Composite Leading Indicator, 1962-2018 Long-term trend = 100, NBER U.S. recessions shown


Source: OECD

World trade growth has decelerated Worst performance since the end of the Great Recession in 2008/09



China's manufacturers report falling activity Sharp slowdown since May 2018

China purchasing managers' index, 2005-2019 Manufacturing sector, monthly and 12-month average



Source: China National Bureau of Statistics

U.S. manufacturing growth has slowed since Aug 2018 ISM manufacturing index shows sharp deceleration to slowest growth since 2016




U.S. manufacturing loses momentum Mid-cycle slowdown or end-of-cycle recession? Signs are still ambiguous

U.S. Purchasing Managers' Index, 1950-2019

Manufacturing, diffusion index, base = 50

Monthly and 12-month moving average



Source: Institute for Supply Management, Manufacturing Report on Business


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U.S. freight volume growth has decelerated since summer of 2018 Freight volumes growing around +3% down from +8% in middle of last year



U.S. Treasury yield curve inversion signals heightened recession risk FRBNY yield curve model shows 30%+ probability of recession in May 2020


Probability of U.S. recession 12-months ahead, 1960-2020 Based on Federal Reserve Bank of New York's yield-curve model Using spread between 3-month Treasury bills and 10-year Treasury Notes



FRBNY yield curve model currently puts recession risk around 35% Recession risk now higher than before 1990 and 2001 downturns


New York Fed yield-curve recession probability model

Implied probability of recession 12 months ahead Using spread between 3-month Treasury bills and 10-year Treasury notes




U.S. business cycle very mature


Do expansions die of old age or are they murdered? Risks of policy error?



U.S. Federal Reserve typically responds to signs of slowing economy If manufacturing growth decelerates further, Fed likely to ease monetary policy



U.S. interest rate traders expect almost three quarter point cuts by end 2019 Insurance policy against deeper and more prolonged slowdown



Scenarios for the global economy in 2019 U.S./China relations, business reaction, Fed response dominate outlook

U.S./China relations

- (1) Comprehensive settlement
- (2) Limited trade deal
- (3) No deal



- (1) Extended pause
- (2) Easing
- (3) Renewed tightening



Global economic outlook

- (A) Re-acceleration
- (B) Extended slowdown
- (C) Recession

Mid-cycle slowdown or end of cycle? Is the global economic cycle in 1998 or 2001?

Brent prices and the economic cycle – 1998 or 2001? Intra-cycle and end-cycle slowdowns have different consequences for oil market

@JKempEnergy

Brent spot price, 1990-2019 Percent change from year earlier, monthly and 3-month average NBER U.S. recession dates shown 200 150 100 50 -50 -100 2000 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018


Source: ICE Futures Europe, National Bureau of Economic Research

Brent spot price and the global economic cycle Spot price have slumped as economic and consumption outlook worsens

OECD composite leading indicator versus Brent price


Leading indicator long-term trend = 100

Brent front-month futures price, 12-month percent change, U.\$\$/bbl




Brent calendar spread and the global economic cycle Spreads have remained strong as a result of (temporary?) supply disruptions

OECD composite leading indicator versus Brent calendar spread Leading indicator long-term trend = 100 Brent spread U.S.\$ per barrel, contango (-) or backwardation (+)




Saudi Arabia has resumed traditional role as swing producer Kingdom can always force oil market into backwardation if it cuts deeply enough




Saudi Arabia is sacrificing market share to protect prices and revenues Policy alternates between price-defence and volume-defence

Saudi Arabia output restraint and Brent prices, 1985-2019 Front-month futures price, percent change compared with prior year



- Saudi Arabia output restraint (from OPEC Statistical Bulletin) Sources: OPEC, ICE Futures Europe
- -Brent front-month futures (percent change versus prior year)
- @JKempEnergy

U.S. crude production has surged in response to price rise since 2016 Shale producers have increased output at fastest rate anywhere in history



U.S. crude output increased by +1.4 million b/d in year to Mar 2019 Shale boom now decelerating with growth down from +2.0 million b/d in Aug

U.S. crude oil production, 2000-2019
Increase compared with prior year, monthly and 3-month average, 000 b/d



U.S. L48 onshore output increased by +1.25 million b/d in Mar Growth slowing from peak of +1.9 million b/d in Aug-Sep 2018


U.S. crude oil production, 2013-2019 Lower 48 states excluding federal Gulf of Mexico, 000 b/d Increase compared with prior year, monthly and 3-month average



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration


@JKempEnergy

U.S. shale producers have been cutting rig count since end of 2018 Rig count typically follows changes in WTI with lag of 16-20 weeks



White House has revealed preference for prices below \$75 or even \$70 Presidential interventions via twitter as focus turns to re-election campaign

Brent crude front month futures price, U.S.\$ per barrel Presidential tweets and television interviews about OPEC shown



Source: Intercontinental Exchange

Conclusions

Key sources of uncertainty

Oil outlook will be dominated by developments in the global economy

- ❖ U.S./China relations, business confidence, trade growth
- **❖** Fed reaction function
- Intra-cycle slowdown or end of cycle?
- Final boom?

White House must choose between aggressive sanctions policy and low oil prices

- Squeezing Iran and Venezuela
- Political impact of rising prices
- Gearing up for 2020 campaign
- ❖ NOPEC legislation and tweets
- Leverage over Saudi Arabia?

Saudi Arabia must choose between raising prices and protecting market share

- **Kingdom's price target: \$75? \$80? \$85? \$90?**
- * Replacing sanctioned barrels from Iran and Venezuela
- Spare capacity and production ceiling
- Future investment
- * Revenue needs and social transformation
- Aramco privatisation?